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I. Introduction  
 
As soon as Muhammad Jabir heard about the fire in the factory Ali Enterprises (hereinafter 
AE) on 11 September 2012 in Karachi, he rushed there in order to look for his son, a machine 
operator. He came too late. Along with almost 300 others, his son was dead. After the first 
months of grieving, together with other family members, he founded the Ali Enterprises 
Factory Fire Affectees Association (hereinafter Affectees Association), supported by the 
Pakistani National Trade Union Federation. Within a year, more than two hundred survivors 
and family representatives of deceased workers had become members, speaking out for their 
rights, for adequate compensation, and the need for long-term structural change in the safety 
conditions in garment factories.    
 
As the major and maybe the only buyer of the apparel produced at the factory AE, the 
German retailer KiK Textilien GmbH (hereinafter KiK) started negotiations with a prominent 
labor organization, PILER, in Pakistan shortly after the fire. Within a few months, KiK 
donated one million USD into a fund to be paid out to the beneficiaries as a short-term relief. 
In a written agreement, KiK agreed to discuss its contribution to longer-term compensation. 
The subsequent negotiations between KiK and those representing the beneficiaries, however, 
were slow and in February 2015, the members of the Affectees Association rejected KiK’s 
offer as it was deemed too low and without guarantee of actual payment. Instead, they decided 
to bring a lawsuit in Germany, where KiK is headquartered, arguing that adequate reparations 
for the victims is not a matter of charity, but a matter of legal liability. Mr. Jabir is one of the 
claimants in this lawsuit.5 
 
On 29 August 2016, the court (Landgericht) in Dortmund, Germany, accepted jurisdiction and 
granted legal aid to the Pakistani claimants to cover the legal fees.6 Shortly after this 
significant decision, in separate negotiations, an agreement was reached in which KiK 
committed to pay 5.15 million USD to those affected by the factory fire at Ali Enterprises.7 
The agreement was signed on 9 September 2016 and was the result of talks enabled by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) with the German retailer KiK, IndustriALL Global 
Union and the Clean Clothes Campaign, on request of both the German and Pakistani 
government. Notwithstanding this victory, the legal claim filed in Dortmund against KiK 
continues. The legal claim asks for the symbolic payment of damages for pain and suffering, 
which are not covered by the ILO agreement.  
 
                                                 
5
 For details, see <http://www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/business-and-human-rights/working-conditions-in-south-
asia/pakistan-kik.html>. 
6
 Zeit Online, KiK muss wegen Fabrikbrand vor Gericht (30 August 2016) 
<http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/2016-08/schadenersatzklage-kik-pakistan-brand-
prozesskostenhilfe-textilfabrik>.  
7
 International Labor Organization (ILO), Compensation arrangement agreed for victims of the Ali Enterprise 
factory fire in Pakistan (10 September 2016) Press Release <http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_521510/lang--en/index.htm>.  
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The case pending before the German court thus poses the question of supply chain liability. 
Until now, this possibility of holding buyers accountable for harms occurring in their supply 
chains has been discussed in academic analyses8 and in guidelines by the United Nations 
(UN)9 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)10, but 
seldom in a courtroom. Taking the lawsuit by the Pakistani plaintiffs against KiK in Germany 
as a case study, this article provides an analysis of the available legal grounds for such 
liability.11 In order to provide the relevant context to the discussion, the article begins by 
sketching out the relevant legal developments that have taken place due to the effects of 
economic globalization. Economic changes have ushered in linkages between purchasers and 
suppliers that call for strong principles of liability – principles that are already embedded in 
the law but which need fresh articulation and application. This is followed by a brief 
description of the facts of the KiK case. The article then turns to an in-depth analysis of the 
possible causes of action in tort under common law12 in Jabir v KiK, in particular vicarious 
liability, non-delegable duty of care, and the tort of negligence. According to KiK, its 
practices leading to the numerous deaths were not unique to its business, but the standard 
industry practice.13 The outcome of the lawsuit will thus have an impact beyond this single 
case. The Dortmund court’s decision to award legal aid to the foreign claimants already sent 
the signal that the possibility of supply chain liability is not without merit.14   
  
II. Legal developments in the context of economic globalization 
Before 1900, employers were generally not held responsible for injuries to their employees. 
According to legal sociologists Hoekema and Van Manen, workers led the push for a new 
legal understanding by bringing lawsuits against their employers.15 While the legal claims 
were unsuccessful, the workers managed to put the issue on the political agenda. One of the 
first countries in Europe to do so, in 1884 Germany enacted new legislation recognizing 
employers’ liability for injuries occurring in the course of employment. Insurance paid for by 
the employer guaranteed compensation. Soon other European countries followed suit. The 
significance of these laws lies in the shift from fault-based liability towards risk-based 
obligations. Today, changes in the globalized textile industry — with widespread outsourcing 
and offshoring — again warrant shifts in the understanding of liability and its basis.16 
                                                 
8
 See for instance, P Rott/V Ulfbeck, Supply Chain Liability of Multinational Corporations? (2015) 3/23 
European Review of Private Law (ERPL) 415-436. 
9
 J Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations ʽProtect, Respect and Remedyʼ Framework, Human Rights Council, UN-Doc. 
A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011). 
10
 OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (2011).  
11
 While the case inevitably also raise questions about the responsibility of auditing companies, this article 
focuses on the potential liability of transnational retailers. 
12
 As the lex causae in Jabir v KiK is the law of Pakistan, which considers English common law principles on 
tort as authoritative, the analysis will be limited to the principles found in those two jurisdictions. 
13
 KiK Response to claim (26 August 2015) p 6, on file with the authors. 
14
 Court order in the case 7 O 95/15, 7th Zivilkammer Dortmund (29 August 2016).  
15
 A J Hoekema/N F van Manen, Typen van legaliteit (2nd edn 2000) 133. 
16
 Hoekema/van Manen (fn 15) 133.  
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In response to the globalization of industrial manufacturing during the past three decades 
activists have called for increased responsibility of retailers for the working conditions in their 
supply chains.17 According to the International Trade Union Confederation, about 116 million 
people work in the “hidden workforce” of supply chains for 50 of the world’s largest 
companies.18 Clearly, domestic governments and factory owners have to play an important 
role in creating and implementing a regulatory framework which effectively guarantees the 
fundamental rights of workers. Governmental inspectorates have to safeguard adherence to 
labor laws through regular inspections. However, under the pressures of global competition 
and the goal of attracting foreign investment, governments and factory owners in countries 
such as Pakistan and Bangladesh have not always been willing or able to ensure adequate 
working conditions. In response to this lack of governmental enforcement and the increasing 
demand for fair trade by western consumers, the 1990s and 2000s were characterized by 
attempts to improve working conditions through the establishment of in-house and third party 
monitoring mechanisms commissioned by European and North-American buyers. Retailers 
have increasingly drafted Codes of Conduct or adopted existing ones such as the Code of the 
Business Social Compliance Initiative.19  
 
A. The privatization of monitoring 
Private monitoring initiatives are premised on the assumption that in buyer-driven value 
chains the retailing brands “have considerable control over how, when and where 
manufacturing will take place, and how much profit accrues at each stage.” 20 Due to the 
highly competitive and globally decentralized producing factories, especially production of 
simple apparel is characterized by asymmetry and dependency between the supplier and the 
lead firm.21 
 
During the past twenty years, social audits on the basis of such Codes of Conduct have, 
however, not been able to meaningfully improve working conditions.22 Academic research has 
further documented that as a stand-alone measure, without integration in the management 
                                                 
17
 G Seidman, Beyond the Boycott: Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Transnational Activism (2007); A Hale/J 
Wills, Women Working Worldwide: Transnational Networks, Corporate Social Responsibility and Action 
Research (2007) 7 Global Networks 453-476; J Hurley/D Miller, The Changing Face of the Global Garment 
Industry, in: A Hale/J Wills, Threads of Labour (2005) 23.  
18
 International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Scandal – Inside the global supply chains of 50 top 
companies (2016) 6. 
19
 R van Tulder/J van Wijk/A Kolk, From chain liability to chain responsibility (2009) 85 Journal of Business 
Ethics (JBE).   
20
 G Gereffi/O Memedovic, The global apparel value chain: What prospects for upgrading by developing 
countries (2003) United Nations Industrial Development Organization 4.  
21
 The apparel industry in South Asia is understood to be a so-called ʽcaptive value chainʼ, with low-capacity 
suppliers, G Gereffi/J Humphrey/T Sturgeon, The governance of global value chains (2005) 12 Review of 
International Political Economy (RIPE) 86-92.  
22
 G Burckhardt, Todschick. Edle Labels, billige Mode – unmenschlich produziert (2014) 116; SOMO/Clean 
Clothes Campaign, Fatal Fashion (2013) 15, Human Rights Watch, Whoever Raises their Head Suffers the Most, 
Workers’ Rights in Bangladesh’s Garment Factories (2015)  60-61.  
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structures and the presence of a trade union, codes of conducts and audits are not likely to 
lead to any improvements.23 Critics also argue that there is an inherent conflict of interest for 
auditors that are paid by the factory or brand.24 More fundamentally, the quantification and 
rankings produced by check-lists may even obscure a real diagnosis of working conditions.25 
According to some critics, the scope and form of audits are not designed to uncover 
irregularities but to uphold the system of outsourcing.26 As transnational corporations have 
become entrusted to govern themselves, and report on their efforts to government and the 
public, there has been a persistent decline of state based monitoring of production processes in 
many countries.27  
 
In the face of these limits of the achievements of voluntary company commitments, the 
catastrophes of the factory fire at Ali Enterprises in Pakistan (September 2012) and the 
collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh (November 2013) have led to another 
response as well: the filing of lawsuits by survivors and family members demanding legal 
responsibility from European and North-American retailers. While in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan lawsuits are ongoing against owners of factories that did not provide adequate fire 
safety measures, against government authorities that provided invalid permits, and against 
inspectorates that failed to ensure proper inspections, these other lawsuits address the 
accountability of the retailers that outsourced manufacturing of goods sold in their outlets to 
these factories.   
 
B. Going beyond voluntary monitoring: judicial routes to accountability 
Previous efforts to hold companies accountable for abusive working conditions in the textile 
industry were limited to a few complaints at national contact points of the OECD.28 An 
obvious obstacle to accountability has always been the lack of transparency of supply 
chains.29 The finding of KiK’s Okay labels after the fire at AE factory fire and of many 
different brand labels in the rubble after the Rana Plaza collapse led to the identification of the 
                                                 
23
 RM Locke/BA Rissing/T Pal, Complements or Substitutes? Private Codes, State Regulation and the 
Enforcement of Labour Standards in Global Supply Chains (2013) 51 British Journal of Industrial Relations 
(BJIR); RM Locke/T Kochan/M Romis/F Qin, Beyond corporate codes of conduct: Work organization and 
Labour Standards at Nike’s suppliers (2007) 146 International Labour Review (ILR).  
24
 Locke/Kochan/Romis/Qin (fn 23)  23.  
25
 G Le Baron/J Lister, Benchmarking global supply chains: the power of the ‘ethical auditʼ regime (2015) 41 
Review of International Studies (Rev Int Stud) 905-924. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Eg, Clean Clothes Campaign v Adidas, filed on 5 September 2002. Most recently, in relation to the Rana Plaza 
collapse, Clean Clothes Campaign Denmark and Active Consumers v PWT Group, OECD National Contact 
Point, Denmark, final statement 2016.  
29
 Sherpa, Supply Chain Liability. Legal tools for parent company’s accountability (2007) working document.  
This aspect is sometimes discussed under the concept of ʽtraceabilityʼ the regulation of which is most advanced 
in relation to food and pharmaceutical drugs. See eg JE Hobbs, Liability and traceability in agri-food supply 
chains, in: CJM Ondersteijn/ JHM Wijnands/RBM Huirne/O van Kooten (eds) Quantifying the agri-food supply 
chain (2006)  85-100.   
6 
 
relevant companies that were sourcing in these factories. Such access to sourcing information 
has not normally been available, making it difficult to hold companies accountable.30 
 
Though there has been a wave of lawsuits filed against parent companies for human rights 
harm caused by their subsidiaries, lawsuits to hold purchasers liable for harm caused by their 
suppliers have not been commonplace. Until now, analyses on transnational supply chain 
liability often addressed legal options such as tort, third-party beneficiary breach of contract 
or competition law in an abstract manner.31 Naturally, lawsuits can play an important role in 
shedding new light on existing legal concepts as previously unknown constellations of facts 
are presented to judges with the question whether existing legal concepts apply. This is 
exactly what is happening now. While in Europe a civil lawsuit was filed in 2015 against the 
retailer KiK for damages caused by lack of fire safety at its supplier in Pakistan, Canadian 
lawyers in the same year filed a claim on behalf of survivors and family members of deceased 
workers of two factories in the Rana Plaza building.32 Among the defendants in that claim are 
the retailer George Weston Ltd and its subsidiaries Loblaws and Joe Fresh as well as the 
auditing company Bureau Veritas. The claim is intended to be accepted as a class action, 
which would benefit all survivors and all dependant family members of those that died.33  
 
Thus, in the context of these two concrete lawsuits, courts in Canada and in Germany are 
being asked to assess the relevant duty of care, applicable industry standards of social 
corporate responsibility, the relevant standards for audits, and the retailer’s duty in relation to 
such audits.34 With their factual particularities, these lawsuits will thus contribute to the legal 
debate about supply chain liability by examining the concrete situation and the influence that 
the respective retailers had or could have had over their suppliers, the way in which a duty of 
                                                 
30
 ITUC (fn 18) 25. Notably, Nike and G-Star were early in publishing an overview of manufacturing factories. 
Recently, several more retailers have published their suppliers. This aspect has also received more attention from 
lawmakers. Eg, in March 2016, parliamentarians of the German Green Party requested the drafting of an EU 
Directive on transparency in the production of textiles, Antrag der Abgeordneten Renate Künast et al und der 
Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Kleidung fair produzieren ‒ EU-Richtlinie für Transparenz- und 
Sorgfaltspflichten in der Textilproduktion schaffen. Transparency is a major aspect, eg, of the UK Modern 
Slavery Act and the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act. The UK Act can even be applicable to 
companies incorporated outside of the UK, P Doris/M Zimmer, Ausbeutung in der Lieferkette – Der Modern 
Slavery Act und seine Anwendung auf deutsche Unternehmen (2016) 3 Betriebs Berater 181-183.  
31
 See, eg, M Saage-Maasz, Arbeitsbedingungen in der globalen Zulieferkette. Wie weit reicht die 
Verantwortung deutscher Unternehmen? (2011) Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Internationale Politikanalyse; E 
Kocher, Die Verantwortung von Unternehmen aus juristischer Sicht (no date) Wie weit reicht die Verantwortung 
von Unternehmen? Handels- und Zulieferbeziehungen von multinationalen Unternehmen, 
Tagungsdokumentation. D Cohen Maryanov, Sweatshop Liability: Corporate Codes of Conduct and the 
Governance of Labor Standards in the International Supply Chain (2011) 14 Journal of Small and Emerging 
Business Law 397; Y Queinnec, Supply Chain Liability. Legal tools for parent company’s accountability (2007) 
Sherpa working document.       
32
 New Wave Style Ltd. and New Wave Bottom Ltd.  
33
 H Shaw, Class action suit seeks $2 billion from Loblaw, Joe Fresh over 2013 Bangladesh garment 
factory collapse (30 April 2015) Financial Post. 
34
 The causes of action argued by the plaintiffs in Canada are the tort of negligence, conspiracy and vicarious 
liability. 
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care may have been breached and the way in which a relationship of vicarious liability may 
have come into existence.35   
 
Similar to KiK, the Canadian defendant retailers had codes of conduct to which they pledged 
to adhere throughout their supply chain. A Loblaw spokesperson was reported to have said 
they believe the claim “is without merit” and “intend to vigorously defend our position.”36 
KiK has similarly expressed its determination to reject any claim of liability.37 This typical 
reaction raises the question whether retailers can claim that ethical working conditions are 
important and make public their commitment to a Code of Conduct, while at the same time 
refusing liability when the Code is violated. During the past decade, scholars have debated the 
question whether Codes of Conduct contain only moral obligations or legal ones as well.38 
Regardless of any binding effect, as Rott and Ulfbeck point out, if retailers did not have any 
influence over their supply chains, then their Codes of Conduct and other statements on 
corporate social responsibility would quickly amount to misleading advertisement.39  
 
Indeed, highlighting the discrepancy between company claims in Codes of Conduct or 
advertising on the one hand and the reality in supply chains on the other, has been the subject 
of legal proceedings in Germany (against Lidl), France (against Auchan), and the United 
States (against Nike).40 As Hobbs points out in relation to food safety, preventing free-riders 
on existing certification programs depends on an effective self-policing mechanism. The 
problem of such market failure is thus at least partially dependent on the ability and 
willingness of high quality producing firms to enforce legal protections against false or 
                                                 
35
 See, for example, the following publications which draw upon the claim against KiK,  
G Wagner, Haftung für Menschenrechtsverletzungen (2016) 4/80 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht (RabelsZ); T Thiede/ A Bell, Klagen clever kaufen! (2017) 5 Recht der Internationalen 
Wirtschaft (RIW); C Thomale/L Hübner, Zivilgerichtliche Durchsetzung völkerrechtlicher 
Unternehmensverantwortung (2017) 8 Juristenzeitung.    
36
 CBC News, Loblaw will ʽvigorously defendʼ lawsuit over Rana Plaza factory collapse (30 April 2015).  
37
 Csc, Düsseldorf, KiK sieht sich nach Fabrikbrand nicht in der Haftung (2 September 2015) FAZ 21.  
38
 A Beckers, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes (2015); A Sobczak, Are Codes of Conduct in 
Global Supply Chains really voluntary? (2016) 2/16 Business Ethics Quarterly 167; C Glinski, Corporate codes 
of conduct: moral or legal obligation? in: DJ McBarnet, The New Corporate Accountability (2007) 133; I 
Schömann/A Sobczak/E Voss/P Wilke, Der Einfluss von Codes of Conduct und Internationalen 
Rahmenvereinbarungen auf die soziale Regulierung in Unternehmen (2008) 33.  
39
 Rott/Ulfbeck (fn 8) 422.  
40
 For the so-called Lidl-case in Germany, see www.ecchr.eu. In France, in 2014, three French consumer and 
human rights organizations filed a complaint against the multinational retailer Auchan. According to the 
complaint, labels of Auchan products were found in the rubble at Rana Plaza. The complainants therefore argued 
that the ethical public statements of the brand constitute a commercial practice likely to mislead the French 
consumers about the social conditions of products’ production. The state prosecutor in Lille, where Auchan is 
headquartered, opened investigation in May 2014, but decided to close it again in January 2015 on the basis that 
there was not enough evidence to support criminal prosecution. 
ʽLe groupe Auchan visé par une plainte pour pratique commerciale trompeuse dans le cadre de l’effondrement 
du RanaPlaza ʼ, Sherpa, communiqué de presse (24 avril 2014) <http://www.asso-sherpa.org/le-groupe-auchan-
vise-par-plainte-pour-pratique-commerciale-trompeuse-dans-le-cadre-de-leffondrement-du-rana-
plaza/#.U4CfeVh_uNQ>. 
In California, such proceedings were ongoing in the case Kasky v Nike 27 Cal 4th 939 (2002). Nike eventually 
decided to settle the case.  
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misleading labeling.41 Unlike the case against KiK though, such proceedings are filed on 
behalf of competitors or consumers, not on behalf of harmed workers and their families. 
  
C. Three legal trends 
The step taken in the KiK case to bring the question of supply chain liability before judges is 
built on three legal developments. First, liability of a company for harms in the supply chain 
fits a trend of previous tort cases recognizing the possibility of parent company liability. 
Litigation in the United Kingdom in Chandler v Cape plc has established that under certain 
conditions, a parent company can be liable for harms occurring at the site of its subsidiary.42 
Moreover, it has been established that such liability is also possible in transnational 
constellations. For example, the lawsuit in the Netherlands of the Nigerian farmers Oguru, 
Efanga, and Dooh and the Dutch non-profit organization Milieudefensie against Royal Dutch 
Shell plc and Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd. has confirmed the 
possibility – in principle - of liability of the Dutch parent company for harms that occurred in 
Nigeria.43  
 
Second, the question of legal responsibility along the supply chain fits a growing recognition 
of the need to look beyond traditional company law concepts which restricted liability to a 
single company. For example, EU competition law has developed the concept of “single 
economic entity.” On the basis of this doctrine, parent companies can be held liable for 
violations of EU competition rules, for the conduct of their subsidiaries, when they can be 
considered to form a “single undertaking” within the meaning of Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union.44 The application of this doctrine has even been 
                                                 
41
 JE Hobbs, Consumer Demand for Traceability (2003) International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium 
03-1 Working Paper, < http://www.iatrcweb.org/>. 
42
 C van Dam, Tort Law and Human Rights: Brothers in Arms: On the Role of Tort Law in the Area of Business 
and Human Rights (2010) 3 Journal of European Tort Law (JETL); R Meeran, Tort Litigation against 
Multinational Corporations for Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the Position Outside the United 
States (2011) 3 City University of Hong Kong Law Review (CityU LR). In a clear move away from attempts to 
establish liability by piercing the corporate veil, the argued basis for liability in this case was conventional tort 
litigation alleging direct negligence by the parent company.    
43
 Court of Appeal The Hague (18 December 2015) ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3586 (Dooh/Shell); Court of 
Appeal The Hague (18 December 2015) ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3588 (Oguru-Efanga/Shell). There are 
currently no English translations of the Court of Appeal decisions. For an analysis and summary, see C van Dam, 
Preliminary judgments Dutch Court of Appeal in the Shell Nigeria case, online available at ceesvandam.info.  
44
 This depends on two cumulative requirements. First, it has to be demonstrated that the parent company has the 
potential power to direct the conduct of the subsidiary. Second, it must be shown that the parent company has 
actually exerted that power. Case  T-587/08 Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., v European Commission [2013] 
EUECJ T-587/08 para 56 and jurisprudence cited there. If this is the case, the Commission can regard the parent 
company and the subsidiary as jointly and severally liable for the payment of a fine, without having to establish 
the personal involvement of the parent company in the infringement. Such fines can amount up to 10 per cent of 
the group‘s annual turnover. S Thomas, Guilty of a Fault that one has not committed: the Limits of the Group-
Based Sanction Policy Carried out by the Commission and the European Courts in EU-Antitrust Law (2011) 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (JECLAP). Case C-97/08 P Akzo Nobel and Others v 
Commission [2009] ECR I-8237 para 59; Case C-90/09 P General Química and Others v Commission [2011] 
ECR I-1 para 38; Case C-521/09 P Elf Aquitaine v Commission [2011] ECR I-0000 para 55. 
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extended to circumstances beyond the relationship of a parent company and its wholly owned 
subsidiary.45  
 
Third, in the area of business and human rights, lawsuits addressing supply chain liability fit a 
longer trend in which multilateral declarations have paved the way for recognizing 
responsibility of business enterprises along their supply chain, such as the latest update of the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) and the endorsement of the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in that same year. For example, 
the responsibility to undertake due diligence to “identify, prevent, and mitigate” potential 
adverse impacts is recognized also for entities along the supply chain.46 This could in turn 
result in purchasers assuming a duty of care in tort to individuals whose human rights have 
been harmed by their suppliers.47   
 
III. The civil claim against retailer KiK48  
A. Fire safety measures at factory Ali Enterprises 
On 11 September 2012 at around 6 pm, a fire broke out at Ali Enterprises factory in Karachi, 
Pakistan. According to a Report by the Health Department of Sindh, 262 deaths were 
officially registered by the surrounding three hospitals as well as an unclear number of injured 
persons.49 The workers died of the burns as well as of smoke inhalation and some who were 
trapped in the basement were boiled in the water utilized to extinguish the fire. Ali Enterprises 
is a private company established in 2000 and owned by a father and his two sons, one of 
whom is the CEO.50 The factory premises consisted of three buildings: Block A, Block B and 
Block C. The fire predominantly affected the three-story Block A, the factory’s main building 
which was completely destroyed.  
 
                                                 
45
 Economic entities have also been deemed to exist between joint ventures and its parents, companies and non-
affiliated sales agents and between partnerships where the same natural persons are involved as partners.  
Thomas (fn 44).   
46
 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) Commentary 14 of General Policies (II), 23. In 2015, 
a new OECD Guidance document was discussed in the Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct, 
explicitly also dealing with questions of leverage and due diligence in relation to different supplying tiers in 
supply chains, see for example, J Wilde Ramsing, KMG Genovese, V Sandjojo, Submission to the joint meeting 
of the OECD Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct and the NCPs (2015) 
<http://www.oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_4264/>. See also most recently, OECD (2017), OECD 
Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear Sector.  
47
 See for an analysis of such a duty of care in parent-subsidiary relationships D Cassel, Outlining the Case for a 
Common Law Duty of Care of Business to Exercise Human Rights Due Diligence (2016) 2/1 Business and 
Human Rights Journal (BHRJ) 179 – 202. 
48
 As background to the lawsuit, it is important to describe the alleged lack of fire safety measures at the AE 
factory and the monitoring efforts by KiK. Discrepancies between the facts alleged by the claimants and those 
accepted by KiK are noted. 
49
 Statement by the Secretary of Health Department, Government of Sindh (22 October 2012) in Constitutional 
Petition Case 3118/2012 before High Court of Sindh at Karachi, 241 ff including list of the deceased and injured 
persons.  
50
 Pakistan Institute of Labor Education and Research (PILER), Ali Enterprises Fire Case: Key Information 
(2012).  
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While the cause of the fire is disputed, the alleged lack of adequate fire safety measures is at 
the heart of the lawsuit. According to a trade union, the high number of deaths and injuries, 
particularly in the basement and the second floor of Block A, could in particular be traced 
back to the heavy iron bars on the windows and the lack of emergency exits, while the few 
available exits were locked, although KiK denies the lack of sufficient emergency exits.51 
Some survivors reported needing at least ten minutes to break the windows while smashing 
them with two people using heavy machinery in order to escape the building.52 A further 
problem reported was the absence of fire alarms within the warehouse, due to which there was 
a delay before the fire was detected.53 KiK denies the lack of fire alarms.54 According to 
statements by former factory workers there were not enough fire extinguishers and those that 
were there were not in working order, although this is denied by KiK.55 In addition, the 
workers had not been trained to operate the fire extinguisher and thus were not prepared for 
using it, again a claim which is rejected by KiK.56 Auditing organization Social 
Accountability International later reported that there was no general fire safety training at the 
factory.57 
 
KiK was the main purchaser of the textiles produced in the factory. It has publicly 
acknowledged purchasing 75% of the total goods produced at the factory.58 KiK is the largest 
German textile discounter based in Bönen, Germany, founded in 1994 by Stefan Heinig and 
Tengelmann Holding.59 Typical for globally active retailers, KiK sources over 300 million 
textile articles through its global supply chain. It trades with over 500 suppliers based in 
countries all around the world,60 particularly in Asia, mainly in China and Bangladesh but 
also in Pakistan.61 KiK owns over 3,200 branches in eight European countries. The KiK 
product range includes a brand named “Okay”. Clothes of this brand, particularly jeans, were 
produced in the AE factory in Karachi. KiK has been buying from AE since 2007. According 
                                                 
51
 Z Khan, Mapping Conditions of the Workers of Ali Enterprises in Karachi (2012) National Trade Union 
Federation; KiK Response to claim (26 August 2015) pp 23-24, on file with the authors. 
52
 Affidavit of witness AA, born 1957, helper for 5 years at Ali Enterprises (26 October 2015) on file with 
author; Affidavit of witness MM, born 1960, machine operator for 5 years at Ali Enterprises (26 October 2015) 
on file with author; SOMO/Clean Clothes Campaign, Fatal Fashion (2013).  
53
 Affidavit of witness MZ, 25 years old, machine operator at Ali Enterprises for about 4 years (26 October 
2015) on file with author.  
54
 KiK Response to claim (26 August 2015) p 24, on file with the authors. 
55
 Z Khan (fn 50); KiK Response to claim (26 August 2015) p 24, on file with the authors.  
56
 Affidavit of witness SA, worker at Ali Enterprises for 4 years (26 October 2015) on file with author; KiK 
Response to claim (26 August 2015) p 24, on file with the authors.  
57
 Social Accountability International (SAI), Report Addendum: Fire Safety in Pakistan and Worldwide 
(undated).    
58
 Statement of Michael Arretz, then KiK’s Managing Director for Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Corporate Communication, cited in: H Kazim/N Klawitter, Zuverlässiger Lieferant (22 October 2012) 43/2012 
Der Spiegel.  
59
 KiK Textilien and Non-Food GmbH, Zahlen-Daten-Fakten (undated) <http://www.kik-
textilien.com/unternehmen/fileadmin/user_upload_de/Kategorien/Presse/Zahlen-Daten-Fakten-
KiK_Juli%202012.pdf>.  
60
 Csc (fn 37).  
61
 KiK Textilien, Lieferanten <http://www.kik-textilien.com/unternehmen/verantwortung/lieferanten/>. 
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to statements made by former KiK Managing, Dr. Michael Arretz, the AE factory “grew big” 
through its business with KiK.62  
 
B. KiK Textilien’s corporate social responsibility strategy  
According to its Sustainability Report of 2010, KiK puts orders to its suppliers through forms 
that contain details on the description, specification and volume of goods, delivery and 
shipping agreements as well as price and payment conditions. Along with the order form the 
supplier is sent the general purchase conditions, which is signed by the supplier, and 
emphasizes that the use of child labor, silica gel and sandblasters in the production of the 
goods is not permitted.63 Since 2006, KiK has its own Code of Conduct, which all suppliers 
had to sign as well. The general terms and conditions rest upon the Code of Conduct, which is 
described as the “basis for the working relationship.”64 According to KiK’s Code of Conduct, 
its violation can lead to termination of business.65 Furthermore, the Code claims that any 
standard violation which is revealed to KiK will be sanctioned within the scope of its 
influence.66 This strong influence over production conditions is reiterated in KiK’s affirmation 
in its Sustainability Report that:  
 
“Like most retailers we don’t operate our own factories, but work with local 
manufacturers and suppliers.  That’s why we are determined to ensure that anyone who, 
through their work, contributes to our success, does so in appropriate conditions and 
with full access to their rights. To create a binding basis for all our commercial 
relationships, in 2006 we developed an international Code of Conduct, aligned with 
SAI’s recognised SA8000 standard and comparable with the BSCI code of conduct”. 
 
AE was what is called a first tier supplier. While the contractual relations were initially 
brought about through a middleman company, KiK and AE were in direct business contact. 
On behalf of KiK there have been four audits in 2007, 2009 and 2011 at AE in order to verify 
compliance with KiK’s Code of Conduct. KiK contracted the private firm UL Responsible 
Sourcing Inc. to carry out these audits.67 In addition to KiK’s auditing efforts, on the initiative 
of the factory owners, AE had been certified with the SA8000 certificate only a few weeks 
before the tragic fire.68  
                                                 
62
 Statement by Dr. Michael Arretz, then KiK’s Managing Director for Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Corporate Communication, cited in: Kazim/Klawitter (fn 58).  
63
  KiK Textilien, Nachhaltigkeitsbericht 2010, 25-39, <http://www.kik-
textilien.com/unternehmen/fileadmin/user_upload_de/Kategorien/Verantwortung/Nachhaltigkeitsbericht/Kapitel
4_Lieferanten.pdf>.  
64
 Code of Conduct, 1.  
65
 Code of Conduct, 3; KiK Textilien (fn 63) 25. 
66
 Code of Conduct, 1.   
67
 C Dohmen, Keine Haftungsgrundlage (2 September 2015) Süddeutsche Zeitung.  
68
 The relevant requirements for such certification are available in the 2008 Standard Document, which lists 
under ʽhealth and safetyʼ number 3.1 the following criteria: ʽThe company shall provide a safe and healthy 
workplace environment and shall take effective steps to prevent potential accidents and injury to workers’ health 
arising out of, associated with, or occurring in the course of work, by minimising, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, the causes of hazards inherent in the workplace environment, and bearing in mind the prevailing 
knowledge of the industry and of any specific hazardsʼ ,Social Accountability International, SA8000® Standard 
and Documents (2008)  <http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=937>.  
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The lawsuit in Dortmund inevitably exposes the weakest elements of the existing systems of 
corporate social responsibility. In their argument for liability, the claimants refer to KiK’s 
own claims of sustainable sourcing from its public sustainability reports, in which KiK claims 
to visit suppliers frequently as well as to implement corrective action plans (CAPs) on the 
basis of audit reports.69 The claimants conclude that KiK had knowledge of the lack of fire 
safety measures and the power to influence AE to implement fire safety measures. In its 
rejoinder to these allegations, KiK on the one hand insists that it had in place a system for 
monitoring and ensuring compliance with its own claims of corporate social responsibility. 
KiK confirms that suppliers were obliged to sign KiK’s Code of Conduct and that it expects 
suppliers to abide by this Code. KiK further explains that the Code was to make clear to the 
suppliers how important these ethically motivated principles are.70  
 
On the other hand, KiK points out that none of these efforts imply that it had any influence on 
the factory processes at AE.71 In its defense, KiK describes its sourcing process as flexible and 
without formal framework contracts because of the cyclical nature of the clothing business 
and the changing fashion trends.72 It also argues that the topics of conversation during 
meetings in Karachi between staff of KiK and AE were limited to “commercial” issues, 
rejecting any notion of control over health and safety conditions in the factory.73 KiK 
emphasizes that during their visits its employees at no time inspected or influenced the 
factory, the management or the working procedures. This was not deemed to be their task.74  
 
C. Jurisdiction and applicable law in the Dortmund Court  
Unlike the challenges to jurisdiction in many of the transnational cases in the courts of 
common law jurisdictions such as the United States, Australia and Canada under the “forum 
non conveniens” doctrine, the territorial jurisdiction of the court of Dortmund in Germany 
simply flows from KiK’s place of registration (Art. 2 Section 1 together with Art. 60 Section 
1 Brussels I Regulation). In accordance with Art. 4 Section 1 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 
(“Rome II”), the law applicable in the case of extra-contractual claims is the law of the State 
in which the harm occurred (lex loci damni). In Jabir v KiK this is the law of Pakistan. 
Principles of the law of tort in Pakistan are mainly derived from the English common law. As 
Pakistani courts consider English cases as persuasive authority particularly in tort cases, 75 the 
arguments advanced below are based on English law.  
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 KiK Textilien (fn 63) 27.  
70
 KiK Response to claim (26 August 2015) p 9, on file with the authors. 
71
 F Kolf, KiK wehrt sich gegen Klage von Brandopfern (2 September 2015) Handelsblatt, < 
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 KiK Response to claim, 26 August 2015, p 5, on file with the authors. 
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 Dohmen (fn 67). 
74
 KiK Response to claim (26 August 2015) p 7, on file with the authors.  
75
 M Lau, Introduction to the Pakistani Legal System, with special reference to the Law of Contract (1994) 1 
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IV. The legal argument for supply chain liability  
 
A. Introduction to different causes of action  
Jabir v KiK concerns the potential liability of a purchaser of goods for harm ostensibly caused 
by its supplier of goods to third parties, i.e. employees of AE. Making a case for KiK’s 
liability is a challenging one, as the relationship between the purchaser and the supplier is of a 
contractual nature, and as such an ‘arm’s length’ transaction on the face of it. Additionally, 
the victims were employed by AE, and appear to have no formal relationship with KiK. Yet, 
the claimants argue that KiK should be held liable for the injuries resulting from the fire. 
Three alternative grounds for liability are advanced in the claim and supported by the legal 
opinion submitted by the claimants:76 (1) Breach of a direct duty of care in negligence owed 
by KiK to the employees of AE (2) Breach of a Non-Delegable Duty of Care owed by KIK to 
the employees of AE, and (3) Vicarious liability on the part of KIK for the negligence of AE. 
Each of these grounds is elaborated below. 
 
The arguments for liability advanced in Jabir v KiK can be extended to certain supply chain 
relationships, where one of the parties (supplier or the purchaser) is in a special position of 
influence, such that the contractual relationship between them can no longer be considered an 
‘arm’s length’ transaction. In the case of KiK and AE, the relationship of influence might 
arise from (1) KiK’s representations in its Sustainability Report and Code of Conduct that it 
ensures supplier compliance with minimum labour standards, including “a ban on child 
labour, a ban on forced labour or discrimination, maximum working hours, health and safety 
standards for the workplace, information and reporting standards for suppliers, as well as 
employees’ freedom of association.” (2) KiK’s audit of compliance including the right and 
opportunity to draw up CAPs and impose sanctions on AE if the latter fails to meet the 
standards (3) dependence of AE on KiK for survival as a business, which allows KiK to use 
its position of power, were it to wish to, to improve working conditions. This type of 
purchaser-supplier relationship is analogous to those in which the courts have in the past 
found corporate civil liability to arise out of certain parent company-subsidiary relationships.    
B. Tort of negligence  
The negligence claim against KiK is based upon an allegation that it failed to do its share to 
prevent the physical harm suffered by AE employees in breach of a legal obligation to secure 
a healthy and safe working environment. In order to establish negligence liability, the 
claimants must demonstrate that (1) KiK owed them a duty of care to help procure a healthy 
and safe working environment, (2) KiK’s omission to act amounts to a breach of this duty, 
and (3) a causal link exists between the omission to act and the harm suffered by the 
employees.77 While the principles of English common law hold that there can generally be no 
liability for an omission, there are significant exceptions to this principle, including situations 
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 On file with the authors. 
77MA Jones/ AM Dugdale/M Simpson, Clerk & Lindsell on the Law of Torts (21st edn 2016) ch 8.04. 
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in which a duty arises from a relationship between the parties which gives rise to an 
“imposition or assumption of responsibility”.78 
 
As the type of acts or omissions giving rise to a duty of care are not limited to an exhaustive 
list of situations, the facts of a case are of utmost importance to determine whether a new 
situation can be brought within existing principles such that a duty of care will be held to 
exist..79 It has been recognized in case law that categories of negligence develop incrementally 
and by analogy with previous cases, particularly where ‘an earlier limitation is no longer 
logically or socially justifiable’.80 Due to the lack of an English precedent which establishes 
that a purchaser of manufactured goods owes a duty of care in negligence towards the 
manufacturer’s employees, alongside that of the manufacturer itself, the first challenge for the 
AE employees is to establish that KiK owed them a duty of care. However, as stated by Lord 
Toulson in Michael81 the law of negligence is not static. Many of the decided cases that are 
referred to below have developed the law in explicit recognition of changed social conditions, 
changed commercial and industrial practice, and changed social perceptions of right and 
wrong. Where special circumstances of a supply chain relationship coincide with the 
circumstances of past negligence cases, and the changed social and commercial conditions 
justify imposition of responsibility, it should be possible to find a duty.  
 
1) Duty of care 
The first step to finding a duty of care is to establish that the purchaser has assumed 
responsibility towards the employees of AE to ensure a healthy and safe working 
environment. In order to determine whether a defendant has assumed such a responsibility 
towards a claimant, courts commonly employ the three stage test set out in Caparo v 
Dickman.82 This requires the claimant to establish (i) that the harm was foreseeable; (ii) 
proximity of relationship between claimant and defendant; and (iii) that it is fair, just and 
reasonable that the law should impose a duty of a given scope on one party for the benefit of 
the other. 
 
a. Foreseeability and proximity  
The test of reasonable foresight and proximity was formulated by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v 
Stevenson,83 where he stated that one “must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions 
which [one] can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure [one’s] neighbour.” Neighbours, 
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 In Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241, Lord Goff identified four circumstances in which a 
party may become liable for an omission to act:  (a) where there is a special relationship between defendant and 
plaintiff based on an assumption of responsibility by the defendant; (b) where there is a special relationship 
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for a state of danger which may [be] exploited by a third party; and (d) where the defendant is responsible for 
property which may be used by third party to cause damage; See also (fn 77) chs 8.50-8.54. 
79
 Jones/ Dugdale/Simpson (fn 77) ch 8-05. 
80
 See for instance, Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales [2015] AC 1732, p. 1761. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. 
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 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, p.580. 
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in this context, would include those that are “so closely and directly affected” by the act or 
omission that the defendant must have had them within his/her reasonable contemplation. To 
assess proximity in Jabir v KiK, the court would ask whether the AE employees were closely 
and directly affected by KiK’s conduct in regards to the health and safety conditions in the 
factory, and so should have been within the reasonable contemplation of KiK. Drilling down 
further to assess the foreseeability of the harm, the court would consider the knowledge that a 
person in KiK’s position would be expected to possess in relation to the injuries suffered by 
the employees resulting from the fire.84  
 
Purchasers like KiK often give specific and detailed instructions to their suppliers not only in 
relation to product specifications, but also in relation to the manner in which the goods are 
produced.85 The latter includes the Code of Conduct type documents that are incorporated into 
basic terms and conditions of business with suppliers. As outlined above, KiK’s Code of 
Conduct contains requirements, inter alia, on the health and safety of workers employed at 
the factory. Inclusion of requirements on health and safety in contracts with suppliers and 
following these up through audits and CAPs, as well as the public statements by KiK about 
their commitment to ensuring appropriate work conditions throughout their supply chain 
might be considered sufficient proof that injuries suffered by the AE employees due to lack of 
fire safety measures at the factory were reasonably foreseeable by KiK. These coupled with 
the fact that there was a history of fires at the factory could reasonably be viewed as rendering 
the occurrence of further fires and physical injury that may result from lack of safety 
measures highly foreseeable. 
 
The requirement for proximity of relationship will be fulfilled where it can be shown that the 
defendant has assumed responsibility to the claimant.86 This was described by Deane J. in 
Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman as “an assumption by one party of a responsibility to take 
care to avoid or prevent injury, loss or damage to the person or property of another or reliance 
by one party upon such care being taken where the other party ought to have known of such 
reliance.” In those cases which conclude that a voluntary assumption of responsibility has 
been recognized, the finding has been that the defendant has so conducted him/herself that the 
claimant is entitled to rely upon the defendant in relation to the subject matter of the duty 
created. Furthermore, decided cases establish that where a defendant has effective control 
over an activity, then a duty of care may be recognized in relation to aspects of that activity.87 
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The primary challenge to establishing proximity between a purchaser and the employees of its 
supplier is overcoming the argument that a defendant, e.g. the purchaser, cannot be held liable 
for failing to prevent another party, e.g. AE, from inflicting damage on a third party, e.g. AE 
employees. The purchaser is merely in a contractual relationship with the supplier, and as 
such has no duty to compel the latter to secure safe working conditions in the factory. In other 
words, this a classic case of an omission for which there can be no liability.88 In Jabir v KiK 
however, the relationship between AE and KiK could well be found to go beyond a mere 
‘arm’s length’ transaction. Apart from setting health and safety standards, KiK appointed 
auditors to inspect the factory in order to secure compliance with the Code of Conduct. KiK 
could be found to have had the power to compel AE to improve its safety provision by 1) its 
de facto ability to exert decisive pressure by ceasing to buy large amounts of output from the 
factory, and 2) its de jure ability to claim a breach of the Code of Conduct incorporated into 
the commercial contracts between it and AE. There are many factors which taken together 
could signify the necessary proximity of relationship/assumption of responsibility by KiK to 
employees of AE to fulfil the requirements for a duty of care. 
 
Once an assumption of responsibility is found, there is a duty on the enterprise in the position 
of KiK to actively intervene to prevent the damage that occurred. The courts will look to the 
de facto – and not just de jure - position of power the purchaser has in relation to its supplier 
to determine whether the damage could be avoided if the defendant intervened to insist on a 
change in safety practice. The Court of Appeal (CA) in England has recently dealt with this 
point in Chandler v Cape Industries Plc.89 In that case, a parent company was held to have a 
duty of care to an employee of its subsidiary, and a duty to intervene in order to fulfill that 
duty, where the employee had been made ill by asbestos dust on the subsidiary‘s premises. 
The Court applied the following criteria in finding a duty of care: (1) the businesses of 
the parent and subsidiary were in a relevant respect the same; (2) the parent had, or ought to 
have had, superior knowledge of some relevant aspect of health and safety in the particular 
industry; (3) the subsidiary's system of work was unsafe as the parent company knew, or 
ought to have known; and (4) the parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or 
its employees would rely on its using that superior knowledge for the employees' protection.  
 
The CA found the parent company liable for failure to intervene to correct its subsidiary’s 
unsafe practice even though the parent had no de jure power, simply on the basis of being the 
parent company, to order its subsidiary to act. It was instead a matter of seeing what, de facto, 
had been the policy towards health and safety adopted in the relationship between the two 
companies, and of seeing where the lines of influence ran, and that could vary from company 
to company. When and if such influence and focus on health and safety is lodged in part in the 
parent company then, as the Court put the point, “… at any stage it (the parent company) 
could have intervened and Cape Products (the subsidiary) would have bowed to its 
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intervention. On that basis … the Claimant has established a sufficient degree of proximity 
between the Defendant and himself.”90 
 
The same could be said of KiK in relation to AE, despite the fact that the latter was not a 
subsidiary but rather a supplier subject to the de facto and de jure power of and integrated into 
the links of production and sale organized by the purchasing company. Chandler is clearly 
distinguishable due to the lack of a corporate structure relationship between KiK and AE. 
However, the fact that Arden LJ stated that the case has nothing to do with piercing the veil 
demonstrates that the corporate structure in itself is not relevant to the assumption of 
responsibility. A purchaser in the position of KiK is arguably in an analogous position to 
Cape Plc. because if it had made a commitment to the health and safety policy to be followed 
by the supplier;91 it had enough potential influence over the supplier making it able to fully 
implement its standards had it wished to; it had, via its auditor, specialist knowledge of the 
criteria for distinguishing adequate from inadequate factory safety provisions which the 
supplier did not have; and it was in a line of business that overlapped with that of the supplier 
sufficiently to make it fair that its knowledge and experience should be brought to bear on the 
improvements sought.92 As a company of wide experience in the sector93  KiK arguably was in 
a position to evaluate good practice using criteria rich in detail as compared with that 
available to AE alone. The joint effect of this superior knowledge of current safety criteria, 
taken together with its failure to intervene to rectify working conditions, could be found to 
have created an environment in which AE and its employees relied on KiK’s guidance and 
was encouraged to continue its workplace practices due to the absence of pressure from KiK. 
The working environment was possibly made more dangerous due to strict deadlines set in 
purchase orders for production of high volume of goods.94 In such circumstances, it is possible 
to argue also that the pressure to meet orders led to unsafe working practices such that KiK 
had effectively created a source of danger which may also negative the rule against liability 
for omissions.95  
 
In the case of KiK, there are a number of elements that arguably establish proximity through 
an assumption of responsibility for the safety of AE employees including control over the 
working environment and reliance by the employees of AE. The desire of KiK to exercise 
control over the working conditions in its supply chain is acknowledged in the KiK 
Sustainability Report 2010, as pointed out above.96 This public commitment is put into action 
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by incorporating its Code of Conduct into each purchase order issued to suppliers,97 by 
conducting audits to check compliance with the Code,98 by issuing CAPs in areas of non-
compliance, and finally by holding the contractual right to terminate business relationship for 
failure to comply with the Code.99 The public representations coupled with the legally binding 
nature of a code of conduct and the auditing processes could arguably move a purchaser 
beyond assuming merely a moral responsibility.    
 
Looking at the content of the Code, under the paragraph headed ‘Control’ it states, ‘KiK 
strictly demands that all business partners undertake convincing efforts to reach compliance’. 
A strong analogy can be drawn between the conduct of KiK regarding the manufacture of 
clothing by AE and that of other bodies which apply their regulatory standards to an activity, 
and which have been found liable for failing to do so with due care.100 In each case, the parties 
have made mandatory provision for the regulation of safety of those taking part in the relevant 
activity, those affected have relied upon the expertise of the regulatory body and a duty of 
care has been established. It is not necessary for a duty of care to arise in favour of AE 
employees that they should have knowingly relied upon KiK, either explicitly or implicitly. 
English courts have been clear that they do not consider it necessary that there be conscious 
reliance by a claimant on the relevant body charged with a duty of care so to exercise it.101 It is 
enough that, “… where A advises B as to action to be taken which will directly and 
foreseeably affect the safety or well-being of C, a situation of sufficient proximity exists to 
found a duty of care on the part of A towards C. Whether in fact such a duty arises will 
depend upon the facts of the individual case…”102 
 
The drafting of rules and regulations might seem a more abstract and distant activity than is 
the giving of advice, where the latter is a clear source of liability for negligence. However, 
English courts have made it clear that the same duty of care can attach to the failure to 
implement rules and regulations as it does to advice.103 This is analogous to KiK’s formulation 
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of binding rules in the Code of Conduct for health and safety of workers in the AE factory. In 
Jabir v KiK,it is arguable that there exists a proximate relationship between the claimants and 
the defendant giving rise to an assumption of responsibility; while the Code of Conduct 
contributes to evidence the assumption of responsibility, there were other factors referred to 
above namely: the audits, the CAPs, visits by KiK staff all of which induced reliance by AE 
and its employees upon KiK, as well as the intensity of KiK’s level of demand met by AE.104  
 
b. Is it ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to acknowledge this duty on a purchaser of 
goods? 
In many cases this element can be seen as the consequence of proximity of relationship.105 
Recognition of a duty of care on facts such as Jabir v KiK could well be viewed as promoting 
safer working conditions for vulnerable workers who are exposed on a daily basis to 
hazardous working conditions. KiK is a corporation with enormous global reach; it deals with 
over 500 suppliers and its net sales in 2013 were over US$2 billion.106 However, as the 
Sustainability Report states, KiK does not manufacture anything itself; while knowing 
intimately all aspects of the business from production to sales, it has outsourced entirely its 
manufacturing to countries in which overheads are lower than they would be in Germany. 
Given the features of, and risks created in, that outsourcing, of which the details of Jabir v 
KiK are a central example, it would conform with the established policies of English courts to 
reduce those risks to the vulnerable that the duty of care encapsulates. 107  
 
Furthermore, it is important for KiK’s business reputation and consumer confidence, i.e. its 
social license to operate, that in the sourcing of products it does not profit from exploitation of 
workers in less developed countries and it is for that reason that such retailers undertake 
obligations towards the employees of their suppliers. It is the undertaking of responsibility as 
evidenced by the conduct described above that reassures the consumer and fosters the 
consumer confidence in the products that is so vital to this type of business. Where a retailer 
or a brand obtains consumer goodwill from its public commitments to ensuring compliance 
with international minimum standards of labour throughout their supply chain and fail to live 
up to those commitments, it is entirely fair, just and reasonable that they should be held 
accountable for failings in the supply chain over which they have taken effective control. 
 
In discussing whether it is fair, just and reasonable that a duty of care should be owed, 
reference is often made to the “floodgates” argument and fears of indeterminate liability. 
When assessing this argument, courts distinguish cases of claims for pure economic loss and 
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psychiatric harm (often brought by secondary victims i.e. witnesses to shocking events), each 
of which are types of claim with the potential for “ripple” effects and in which courts are 
concerned about the “floodgates” of liability.108 Where a claim is for physical injury by a 
clearly limited and defined class of claimants,109 and there is no threat that the burden of 
liability may be disproportionate to the conduct involved, an assumption of responsibility will 
more readily be recognised.   
2) Breach duty of care  
Once it is established that a duty of care was owed by a purchaser to the employees of its 
supplier, it is necessary to establish that the duty was breached. The relevant duty in Jabir v 
KiK was a duty to procure a healthy and safe working environment. It could well be found 
that KiK failed to do this as manifested by the failure to do its best to ensure adequate 
emergency exists, adequate fire alarms and extinguishers, safe building construction and that 
workers received appropriate health & safety training. The standard of care applied in English 
law is objective, the reasonable person.110  
 
Where a purchaser assumes responsibility to procure a healthy and safe working environment 
for employees of its supplier through codes of conduct, public statements, and monitoring 
processes such as audit and inspection, it shall carry out the requirements of such 
responsibility with reasonable care. If the purchaser fails to identify, during audits and visits 
to the factory, the most obvious defects in health and safety, fails to follow up on CAPs and 
fails to impose the sanctions envisaged in the contract, it cannot be treated as acting with 
reasonable care. The fact that a defendant has acted in accordance with common practice is 
not necessarily a valid defence, if the act is dangerous.111 Barring windows, especially, in a 
confined and crowded working space lacking appropriate fire exits, and failure to install fire 
safety measures is a bad practice and therefore negligent even if the practice is a common one 
in the production country in which the damage occurred.  
3) Causation   
Having satisfied the duty of care and breach elements, the claimants must also establish 
causation in fact and in law.112 The first test to establish causation in fact is the well-known 
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‘but-for’ test – if the claimants would have suffered their injuries regardless of the defendants’ 
negligence, the negligence has not caused the claimants’ loss.113 But-for causation is 
established on the balance of probabilities, so an event will be treated as a cause if it is more 
likely than not that it was a cause. Where loss of lives and physical injuries were caused by 
the lack of fire safety in the factory, cause of the fire is not relevant to the assessment of 
liability focused on here.114 The barred windows, lack of emergency exits, lack of a 
functioning fire alarm and fire-fighting equipment as well as lack of fire safety training meant 
that the claimants and others were unable to escape the fire. The claim in Jabir v KiK is that 
death and personal injury were caused by defective health & safety standards as a 
consequence of KiK’s alleged failure to meet its obligations to ensure health & safety. It is not 
the fire, but the inability to deal with the fire, that is the root of the claim. The focus here is 
not on whether KiK should have prevented the fire at the factory, but rather on its 
responsibility once that fire had broken out. Thus, in Jabir, it is not argued that KiK caused 
the occurrence of the fire; rather it is argued that KiK in breach of its duty of care failed to 
take appropriate steps to ensure that if a fire occurred, then appropriate health & safety 
mechanisms and building construction were in place to protect those in the factory. 
 
’Causation in law’ refers to the scope of liability. The damage suffered must be a foreseeable 
consequence of the breach of duty, sometimes described as requiring that any damage should 
not be too remote a consequence of the harm.115 The injuries suffered in Jabir v KiK are the 
readily foreseeable consequence of the negligence and would therefore fulfil this requirement. 
The next question is whether or not the precautionary measures to deal with the consequences 
of the fire were adequate. The locking of the fire exits and barring of windows so clearly 
weakened the ability to respond to fire danger that arose that it arguably amounted to a 
substantial, and not just marginal, increase of the risk of death and injury that ensued.116  
 
C. Non-delegable duty of care   
A potential alternative ground for liability in supply chain cases is that the purchaser owed the 
employees of the supplier a non-delegable duty of care. A non-delegable duty of care is 
personal to the defendant and not vicarious.117 The policy of the law with regard to the non-
delegable duty of care is to protect those who are both inherently vulnerable and highly 
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dependent on the observance of proper standards of care by those with a significant degree of 
control over their lives. Thus, a classic – but not the only – example of the non-delegable duty 
of care is that owed by the employer to his employees.118 The number of situations in which 
non-delegable duties have been imposed is limited and so far the concept has not been applied 
in the supply chain context. It might reasonably be suggested that to argue for the recognition 
of non-delegable duties in supply chain relationships is overly ambitious. However, the recent 
decision of the English Supreme Court in Woodland v Essex County Council shows the 
potential scope for extending liability to protect the vulnerable where their safety is 
outsourced to a third party. In Jabir v KiK, claimants argued that while AE exercised physical 
control over employees on a day to day basis, KiK exercised an important element of control 
over the standards of health and safety in the workplace through the programme of standard 
setting, monitoring, audit and enforcement through the ultimate sanction of severing business 
relationships. In such cases, in order to meet the standard of care expected from it, a company 
in the position of KiK is not only expected to appoint a suitable auditor but is also expected to 
take adequate steps to assure itself that the auditor has carried out a suitable risk assessment.119 
Careful selection of the auditor with the mission of assessing risk does not absolve the party 
which selected the auditor from the obligation itself to monitor the adequacy of the auditor’s 
performance.120 The obligation to take steps to ensure adequate control of the risk is personal 
to the appointing party and cannot be delegated.  
 
In Woodland v Essex County Council, Lord Sumption set out the criteria indicative of the 
recognition of a non-delegable duty of care: “… (1) The claimant is a patient or a child, or for 
some other reason is especially vulnerable or dependent on the protection of the defendant 
against the risk of injury. Other examples are likely to be prisoners and residents in care 
homes. (2) There is an antecedent relationship between the claimant and the defendant, 
independent of the negligent act or omission itself, (i) which places the claimant in the actual 
custody, charge or care of the defendant, and (ii) from which it is possible to impute to the 
defendant the assumption of a positive duty to protect the claimant from harm, and not just a 
duty to refrain from conduct which will foreseeably damage the claimant. It is characteristic 
of such relationships that they involve an element of control over the claimant, which varies 
in intensity from one situation to another,... (3) The claimant has no control over how the 
defendant chooses to perform those obligations, ie whether personally or through employees 
or through third parties. (4) The defendant has delegated to a third party some function which 
is an integral part of the positive duty which he has assumed towards the claimant; and the 
third party is exercising, for the purpose of the function thus delegated to him, the defendant's 
custody or care of the claimant and the element of control that goes with it. (5) The third party 
has been negligent not in some collateral respect but in the performance of the very function 
assumed by the defendant and delegated by the defendant to him”. 
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In Jabir v KiK, it appears that the employees were especially dependent upon the purchaser 
since, while the working environment was maintained by AE, it was the purchaser with its 
decisive voice that set the key expectations that standards governing this working 
environment would be met. Symptomatic of this concern was the purchaser’s appointment of 
auditors, contracted to carry our inspections. However, this deployment of auditors is not 
sufficient to discharge such a purchaser’s duty to secure a healthy and safe working 
environment. It continued to be responsible to ensure the safety of the working environment 
and could not legally delegate this responsibility to either to its supplier or the auditor. KiK’s 
own account of its method of management of its supply chains indicates that it was intended 
that there be an ongoing involvement of KiK itself, as well as its auditors, (complementing the 
obligation of AE) in managing several key features of the working environment of the 
victims.  
 
This ongoing relationship between KiK and the employees of AE does arguably place the 
claimants in the care of KiK and required KiK to protect the claimant from a dangerous 
working environment. Control is manifested through the terms of, and threatened sanctions 
associated with the Code of Conduct, and the impacts on the workplace of the volume of 
orders, generating the hours it was necessary to work in order to meet the orders. The 
employees of AE had no control over how KiK elected to try to discharge its obligations, 
either itself or via its auditors and AE. KiK could well be found to have relied upon both AE 
and the auditor to discharge the health and safety functions the performance of which were 
necessary to protect the claimants from death and personal injury, and the auditor and AE 
could be found negligent in the discharge of the functions assigned to them. The argument is 
that a purchaser in the position of KiK has a non-delegable duty to ensure a safe working 
environment: a responsibility which cannot itself be relinquished by entrusting monitoring 
functions to an auditor and by relying on day-to-day management by the supplier. KiK could 
not delegate this duty and the failure of the auditors to correctly report on the deficiencies in 
health and safety at the factory which then allowed the factory continue production unsafely 
could give rise to a breach of this non-delegable duty by KiK. Its reports enabled KiK to 
convey to AE, and thereby to the workforce, that KiK was satisfied that the requirements 
regarding fire safety had been met, so contributing to a false sense of security. The failures of 
the auditor in this regard were failures of a key part of KiK’s own organization and obligation 
in relation to one of its suppliers. Following the requirements set out in the case of Woodland 
v Essex County Council KiK’s failure of organization in this regard damaged a particularly 
vulnerable set of victims in an antecedent relationship to KiK – the employees in the factory 
trapped there by blocked exists and without adequate equipment to fight the fire and smoke. 
 
In previous decades there were objections by academic commentators to the principle of non-
delegable duties, on the ground that it was rare for the initial person at fault not to have the 
resources to compensate victims. However, in Woodland, Baroness Hale stated that “Such 
arguments scarcely apply in today's world where large organisations may well outsource their 
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responsibilities to much poorer and un- or under-insured contractors”.121 This is a central issue 
of policy in this case. It is fair, just and reasonable that purchasers of goods such as KiK, 
which has effectively outsourced its manufacturing processes in order to reduce overheads, 
should be held to account for their failure to protect the vulnerable and dependent claimants. 
It is precisely for vulnerable people such as the claimants that the non-delegable duty has been 
recognised.  
 
D. Vicarious liability  
Vicarious liability could potentially be an alternative ground for holding liable a purchaser of 
manufactured goods for physical harm suffered by its supplier’s employees in the workplace. 
In its classic form, vicarious liability is a strict liability regime under which an employer is 
held liable for harm caused by negligent conduct of its employee(s) in the course of 
employment.122 However, recognition of vicarious liability in other, analogous situations is on 
the move123 and many situations, previously unrecognized, now give rise to such liability. 
While the situations in which vicarious liability has been recognized embrace relationships 
with natural persons who are ‘akin to employees’, there is no reason of principle why such an 
extension could not apply to legal persons. Arguably, vicarious liability on the part of a 
purchaser such as KiK could be present in the following ways:124 (i) the purchaser’s liability 
for the acts and omissions of the supplier; (ii) the purchaser’s potential liability for the failures 
of inspection and accurate reporting by the auditors it appointed, engaged to carry out inter 
alia health and safety evaluation and monitoring in the supplier’s factory.  
 
Clearly, there is no formal employment relationship between the purchaser and the supplier or 
between the purchaser and its auditors. The supplier and the auditor would normally be 
treated as ‘independent contractors’ of the purchaser, and a purchaser will not normally be 
held liable for the harm caused by acts and omissions of such independent contractors.125 
However, there are exceptions to this rule and a formal employment relationship is not always 
necessary to establish the vicarious nature liability.126   
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1) Purchaser’s vicarious liability for the acts and omissions of its supplier 
If the relationship between a purchaser and a supplier is sufficiently like employment, this 
would justify assigning vicarious liability to the purchaser. Alternatively, even where the 
supplier is treated as an independent contractor, it might be possible to bring this within the 
scope of vicarious liability, if there is sufficient control and supervision of the relevant aspects 
of the contractor’s business.127 Much will depend on the factual circumstances of each case, 
and on the willingness of courts to take into consideration the changing social and commercial 
realities that might justify broadening the scope of vicarious liability.128  
 
It could be argued that the relationship between KiK and AE was sufficiently analogous to 
employment for purposes of health and safety provision at AE factory to attract vicarious 
liability. In E v. English Province of Our Lady of Charity the court referred to criteria put 
forward by Professor Kidner129 for assessing whether a working relationship is akin to 
employment as:130  (i) control by the “employer” of the “employee” in terms of whether the 
“employee” was under the management of and accountable to an “employer”; (ii) control by 
the contractor of himself (looking at how the contractor arranges its work, use of assets, and 
payments etc.); (iii) the organisation test (how central was the activity to the objectives of the 
business); (iv) the integration test (whether the activity was integrated into the organisational 
structure of the enterprise); and (v) the entrepreneur test (whether the person was in business 
on his own account). In order to determine whether there is a relationship akin to employment 
between KiK and AE, it is necessary look at the level of control KiK exercised over AE and 
on the integration of AE’s production processes into KiK’s overall organization.  
 
Control in the sense required by imposing a duty of care on a purchaser was discussed above, 
and the points made there are also relevant in the context of the purchaser’s vicarious liability. 
An additional point to discuss here is whether AE remained free to accept or reject the advice 
about improvement of standards enshrined in KiK’s Code of Conduct.131 Three key features of 
the relationship between KiK and AE show that AE was not at full liberty to determine 
standards: i) the Code is not by itself legally binding on AE, but gains its legal force by being 
incorporated as an implied term of the contracts governing production and delivery of goods 
by AE; ii) the Code is further given effect via the de facto power that a purchaser in the 
position of KiK has; iii) the control conferred by (i) or (ii) was combined with the integration 
of AE’s production process into KiK’s overall organization to a degree sufficient to make this 
a relationship akin to employment.  
 
It appears that KiK’s Code of Conduct’s provisions are intended to be incorporated into the 
contracts between KiK and its suppliers. The Code is not itself a contract but, like other 
sources, such as a typical collective agreement in UK employment law that has no legal effect 
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on its own but the bulk of its terms are incorporated into the contract of employment, the 
Code has terms capable of being incorporated into the relevant contracts. The courts in 
England distinguish elements of a company code that while general are i) sufficiently precise 
to be capable of implementation, ii) manifest an intention to create legal relations, and iii) to 
which further customary elements of workplace practice can add, placing on the other side of 
the line those terms in the Code that are no more than policy aspirations.132 There is a clear 
demand, in KiK’s Code of Conduct, intended for incorporation into the on-going series of 
contracts of supply between the companies, that there will be a “safe and clean working 
environment,” as expressed in paragraph 5 of the Code.133 A failure by AE to comply with this 
requirement would amount to a breach of its contractual obligation to KiK, and the sanctions 
flowing from this breach are enough to confer control. 
 
Even if AE has no formal legal obligation to comply with KiK’s standards, KiK may still 
pressure AE to do so by the exercise of de facto power of control. It was on this basis that the 
Court of Appeal in Chandler v Cape Industries found that the parent company had the 
requisite control over the subsidiary: control which the company was responsible for not 
exercising correctly. The subsidiary would have had no legal obligation to comply with the 
parent company’s demand to take certain health and safety measures in Chandler, but would 
have been under significant de facto pressure to do so.134 This was enough for the Court to 
ground a finding of control in the requisite sense. Similarly, a supplier might be under a 
significant pressure to comply with the health and safety standards dictated by a purchaser in 
KiK’s position. 
 
The link between KiK’s control over AE and AE’s integration into KiK’s organization of 
production and sale supports the vicarious liability of KiK for AE’s negligence. KiK argued 
that its business relationships with AE are not stable, long-term mutual engagements, but are 
rather short term, flexible ones.135 In fact, the evidence points in the opposite direction: to a 
relationship over years in which AE played a role that was integrated into the organizational 
structure of the enterprise, as contemplated by element (iv) in the test referred to in Our Lady 
of Charity per Ward LJ.136 As KiK points out in its Sustainability Report, the mechanisms 
which it purports to put in place for the regulation of its relationship with all suppliers, 
including AE, are an integral part of its organizational steps by which it investigates, 
evaluates, and approves or rejects a supplier. The work done by AE in producing a core 
product for KiK’s business on KiK’s behalf is work that must, as the company claims, go 
through its filters designed to assure a product and production process of the requisite 
qualities. This is very different from a situation in which, for example, an architect might be 
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employed by KiK to design a new office building. If the architect does the work negligently 
this does not itself manifest a flaw in the organizational structure and effectiveness of KiK in 
carrying out its core activities. The matter is very different if the negligence appears in the 
process of producing goods which a purchaser claims as its own, and which it sells to the 
public as such: a process of production over which it has de facto control by its ability to 
decisively intervene in fixing both the specifications of the product and certain conditions 
under which it will be produced. 
 
While extending vicarious liability to certain supply chain relationships might be a big step, 
where the relationship between the actors goes well beyond an arm’s length transaction, this 
might be a justified extension, helping to bridge the gap between the law and economic 
realities of the 21st century business models. 
 
2) The purchaser’s potential liability for the failures of its auditors 
In Jabir v KiK, the defendant insisted that that it was not aware of the faults in the safety 
provisions in the workplace having entrusted that assessment to its auditor and its reports. The 
question arises as to whether the appointment of an auditor would suffice to absolve a 
purchaser from liability. Evidence in Jabir v KiK suggests that the auditor’s reports about the 
adequacy of fire safety measures at the AE factory were inaccurate and misleading.137 As 
such, the reports could be found to have been an important contributor to the unwillingness of 
AE to reform its workplace practices, and to KiK’s claim of ignorance of the actual defects of 
factory safety.138  
 
The question arises as to whether KiK should be held vicariously liable for the damage done 
by these negligent assessments carried out by the auditor?139 A route to a purchaser’s vicarious 
liability for its auditor’s failures would be via principles establishing the auditor as agent of 
the purchaser. It is a basic principle of English law that a principal will be liable for the faults 
of its agent so long as the latter is acting within the scope of its actual authority. Under 
Pakistani law, AE could be considered the agent of KiK, the principal, on the basis of the 
Pakistani Contract Act.140 According to Pakistani case law, the relation of agency is created 
when the goods are sold on behalf of the principal and not the agent. It does not require a 
contract of agency to be in writing and this relationship can also be implied.141 An agent can 
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even be someone not being paid by the principal and acting gratuitously.142 An agent is a 
conduit pipe or intermediary between the principal and third party with the competence to 
make the principal responsible to the third person. The auditor is the body exercising a duty 
on behalf of KiK in its relationship with third persons: the employees killed and injured by the 
fire. The auditor stands in for KiK in the discharge of the latter’s responsibility for the 
monitoring function which consisted of verification of the quality of safety in the workplace. 
The auditor is indeed the ‘conduit pipe’ between KiK and the third persons ,who are AE as an 
enterprise and its employees, given the assurance that it was KiK’s obligation to deliver either 
by finding faults that needed to be fixed, or by giving clearance that the fire escape system 
was fit for purpose. 
V. Conclusion  
As mentioned in the introduction, in September 2016, KiK agreed to pay 5.15 million USD 
for income replacement for the injured workers and families of deceased. The lawsuit in 
Dortmund raises the question whether that payment is a matter of charity and voluntary social 
responsibility or whether it complies with an actual legal standard that obliges payment if 
certain objective conditions are met. In their defense, KiK representatives say: „If you are a 
customer at a bakery and buy a piece of bread there, you are not responsible if a day later the 
bakery burns down.”143 In its decision granting legal aid, the court already recognized that the 
case is more complex than KiK’s simple analogy would suggest. As demonstrated in this 
article, the argument for supply chain liability can be based on a combination of longstanding 
private law principles and recent case law that acknowledges the need to reinterpret old 
principles in the light of social change.     
 
English courts have only recently recognized that under certain circumstances, liability might 
attach to a parent company under the tort of negligence for damage to third parties ostensibly 
caused by its subsidiary. The KiK case is testing the extension of such liability to certain 
supply chain relationships. Beyond that, the case is also testing the application of the rules on 
non-delegable duties and vicarious liability, which have been recently applied in other novel 
contexts, in the supply chain context. Even if the court disagrees with the Claimants’ position, 
the novel arguments advanced in this case are likely to be the starting point for an important 
debate about the proper fit between traditional tort law and the fast changing commercial and 
employment relationships of the 21st century. 
 
Where voluntary commitments have failed to protect workers, the recognition of liability of 
retailers for harms occurring in their supply chain can provide the necessary incentive to 
ensure that safety measures are in place. A change may already be underway. Early 2016, a 
newspaper reported that KiK had initiated changes in its auditing commissioning practices, as 
it negotiated with audit companies for longer periods of validity of their reports, thus 
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increasing the potential liability of auditors.144 Supply chain liability thus can be the key to 
transforming current practices to ensure better working conditions in the textile industry.  
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